Case Digest : Magis Young Achievers’ Learning Center vs. Manalo, 579 SCRA 421, G.R. No. 178835 February 13, 2009

 Facts:

1. On April 18, 2002, respondent Adelaida P. Manalo was hired as a teacher and acting principal of petitioner Magis Young Achievers' Learning Center.

2. On March 29, 2003, wrote a letter of resignation addressed to Violeta T. Cariño, directress of the petitioner.

3. On March 31, 2003, respondent received a letter of termination from petitioner because the position of PRINCIPAL will be abolished next school year as a cost-cutting scheme of the school.

4. On April 4, 2003, respondent instituted against petitioner a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month pay, with a prayer for reinstatement, award of full backwages and moral and exemplary damages.

5. Respondent claimed that her termination violated the provisions of her employment contract, and that the alleged abolition of the position of Principal was not among the grounds for termination by an employer under Article 282 of the Labor Code. She further asserted that petitioner infringed Article 283 of the Labor Code, as the required 30-day notice to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and to her as the employee, and the payment of her separation pay were not complied with. She also claimed that she was terminated from service for the alleged expiration of her employment, but that her contract did not provide for a fixed term or period. She likewise prayed for the payment of her 13th month pay under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 851.

6. The petitioners claim that respondent was legally terminated because the one-year probationary period, from April 1, 2002 to March 3, 2003, had already lapsed and she failed to meet the criteria set by the school pursuant to the Manual of Regulation for Private Schools, adopted by the then Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), paragraph 75 of which provides that:  (75) Full-time teachers who have rendered three years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent.

7. Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA): The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal, including the other claims of respondent, for lack of merit, except that it ordered the payment of her 13th month pay in the amount of P3,750.00 because the Labor Arbiter found that the complainant was not dismissed, instead she resigned. It is difficult to imagine complainant would accede to sign a resignation letter as a precondition to her hiring considering her educational background. Thus, in the absence of any circumstance tending to show she was probably coerced her resignation must be upheld.

8. Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)  The NLRC reversed the Arbiter's judgment and the petitioner was ordered to reinstate respondent as a teacher.

9. Ruling of the CA  The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

Issues & Ruling:

Whether the respondent’s resignation is valid.  No, not only because there was no express acceptance thereof by the employer, but because there is a cloud of doubt as to the voluntariness of respondent's resignation. Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and that he has no other choice but to dissociate himself from employment. Voluntary resignation is made with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. It is the acceptance of an employee's resignation that renders it operative. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. To be valid, the resignation must be unconditional, with the intent to operate as such; there must be a clear intention to relinquish the position. In this case, respondent actively pursued her illegal dismissal case against petitioner, such that she cannot be said to have voluntarily resigned from her job.

Whether the probationary appointment of the respondent on April 18, 2002 was for a fixed period of one (1) year, or without a fixed term The probationary appointment is without a fixed term. 

The Court was confronted with two (2) copies of an agreement, one with a negative period and one provided for a one (1) year period for its effectivity. Ironically, none among the parties offered corroborative evidence as to which of the two (2) discrepancies is the correct one that must be given effect.

Under this circumstance, the Court applied Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that, in case of doubt, all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the laborer. Then, too, settled is the rule that any ambiguity in a contract whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations must be read against the party who drafted it. In the case at bar, the drafter of the contract is herein petitioners and must, therefore, be read against their contention.

Thus, following Article 1702 of the Civil Code that all doubts regarding labor contracts should be construed in favor of labor, then it should be respondent's copy which did not provide for an express period which should be upheld, especially when there are circumstances that render the version of petitioner suspect. This is in line with the State policy of affording protection to labor, such that the lowly laborer, who is usually at the mercy of the employer, must look up to the law to place him on equal footing with his employer.

In addition, the employment agreement may be likened into a contract of adhesion considering that it is petitioner who insists that there existed an express period of one year from April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, using as proof its own copy of the agreement. While contracts of adhesion are valid and binding, in cases of doubt which will cause a great imbalance of rights against one of the parties, the contract shall be construed against the party who drafted the same. Hence, in this case, where the very employment of respondent is at stake, the doubt as to the period of employment must be construed in her favor.

Whether respondent, even as a probationary employee, was illegally dismissed  Yes, probationary employees enjoy security of tenure during the term of their probationary employment such that they may only be terminated for cause as provided for by law, or if at the end of the probationary period, the employee failed to meet the reasonable standards set by the employer at the time of the employee's engagement. Undeniably, respondent was hired as a probationary teacher and, as such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to show by competent evidence that she did not meet the standards set by the school. This requirement, petitioner failed to discharge. To note, the termination of respondent was effected by that letter stating that she was being relieved from employment because the school authorities allegedly decided, as a cost-cutting measure, that the position of "Principal" was to be abolished. Nowhere in that letter was respondent informed that her performance as a school teacher was less than satisfactory.

Thus, in light of our ruling of Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. NLRC that, in the absence of an express period of probation for private school teachers, the three-year probationary period provided by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools must apply likewise to the case of respondent. In other words, absent any concrete and competent proof that her performance as a teacher was unsatisfactory from her hiring on April 18, 2002 up to March 31, 2003, respondent is entitled to continue her three-year period of probationary period, such that from March 31, 2003, her probationary employment is deemed renewed for the following two school years.