Case Digest : Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)

 

Topics:

1. Copyrightability of Photographs The Copyright Act provides (17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5(j)) that "Photographs" may be the subject matter of copyright. The Court held that the photograph was a writing of which the photographer was the author and that the Congress could constitutionally make such photograph the subject of copyright. This left open whether an ordinary photograph of a real life object could constitutionally be a proper subject of copyright. The Court found it "obvious" that the result could not be affected by the fact that the pictures represented "actual groups visible things" and that such pictures "drawn from the life" (as opposed to a "composed" subject) could be copyrighted. In this connection, the Court declared: "Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy." (188 U.S. at 249, 23 S.Ct. at 299). And later: "The least pretentious picture has more originality in it than directories and the like, which may be copyrighted" (188 U.S. at 250, 23 S.Ct. at 300). In Pagano v. Beseler Co., 234 Fed. 963, 964 (2 Cir. 1916, the Supreme Court held that "It undoubtedly requires originality to determine just when to take the photograph, so as to bring out the proper setting for both animate and inanimate objects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade, position, etc."
2. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use

Object of the Copyright Controversy
Life	Thompson
480 frames of Zapruder film, of which 140 show the immediate events of the Kennedy shooting incident and 40 are relevant to the shots themselves Life bought the original and all three copies of the film (two of which were noted as then in the possession of the Secret Service).	For failure to obtain consent of Life to use Zapruder’s film in his book, Six Seconds in Dallas, he used "sketches" in the Book. The Supreme Court held that the “sketches” are in fact copies of the copyrighted film. That they were done in charcoal by an "artist" is of no moment.

The Parties:

1. Time Incorporated (Time Inc.), the plaintiff, is a corporation which, among other things, publishes "Life", "Time" and "Fortune" magazines; it also publishes books; and it has "Broadcast divisions", the operations of which presumably involve radio or television broadcasting or both.

2. Abraham Zapruder >> When President Kennedy was killed in Dallas on November 22, 1963, Abraham Zapruder, a Dallas dress manufacturer, was by sheer happenstance at the scene taking home movie pictures with his camera. His filman historic document and undoubtedly the most important photographic evidence concerning the fatal shots was bought a few days later by Life; parts of the film were printed in several issues of the magazine. As to these issues and their contents (including, of course, the Zapruder pictures) and as to the film itself, Life has complied with all provisions of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 1 and following; the Act).

3. Defendant Thompson has written a book, "Six Seconds in Dallas" (the Book), which is a study of the assassination. It is a serious, thoughtful and impressive analysis of the evidence. The Book contains a number of what are called "sketches" but which are in fact copies of parts of the Zapruder film.

4. Defendant Bernard Geis Associates (Associates), a partnership, published the Book on November 18, 1967 and defendant Random House, Inc. has been distributing the Book to the public. Defendant Bernard Geis is the only general partner of Associates.

Facts:

1. The complaint in a single count charges that certain frames of the Zapruder film were "stolen surreptitiously" from Life by Thompson and that copies of these frames appear in the Book as published.

2. The complaint avers that the conduct of defendants is an infringement of statutory copyrights, an unfair trade practice, and unfair competition.

3. While the word "frame" with respect to motion picture film is generally understood, it may be advisable briefly to explain it. [A frame is one of the many still images which compose the complete moving picture.]   A motion picture consists of a series of photographs showing the objects in a scene in successive positions slightly changed. When the series is presented in rapid succession, the optical effect is of a picture in which the objects move. Each separate photograph in the series is called a "frame". Webster's Third New International Dictionary, pp. 902, 1475.

4. Defendants answered on January 15, 1968 and the answer in substance denies that plaintiff has any claim, then pleads nine affirmative defenses, and then pleads the nine affirmative defenses as a partial defense. The affirmative defenses are as follows: first, consent; second, that the Zapruder film could not be the subject of copyright because not original; third, that the Zapruder film could not be the subject of copyright because it could be made "in only a limited number of ways" and to allow copyright would result in the appropriation of the subject matter * * * by a limited number of copyright proprietors"; fourth, through seventh, fair use; eighth, that the Book is protected by the First Amendment and on that account an injunction cannot issue; and ninth, that an injunction will cause defendants irreparable harm.

Issues:

1. Whether the Zapruder pictures of the Kennedy shooting incident are copyrightable. Yes, photographs are copyrightable.

2. Whether the defendants are liable for copyright infringement for using sketches of Zapruder's film in his Book, Six Seconds in Dallas. No because the copying by the defendants is found a fair use.

3. Whether the defendants are liable for unfair competition. No, the parties are not in competition and it has been found that the copying by defendants was fair and reasonable. If the copying of a copyrighted work is not actionable under the Copyright Act, it is doubtful that it is unfair competition under the law of New York.

Ruling:

Re: Copyrightability of Photographs

It is said for defendants that the pictures are simply records of what took place, without any "elements" personal to Zapruder, and that "news" cannot be the subject of copyright.

The Zapruder pictures are "photographs" of an event. The Copyright Act provides (17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5(j)) that "Photographs" may be the subject matter of copyright. If this were all to be considered, it would seem clear that the pictures here were properly copyrighted because Congress has expressly made photographs the subject of copyright, without any limitation.

In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S. Ct. 279, 28 L. Ed. 349 (1884), the Supreme Court found that the photograph in suit had involved the posing of the subject and a choice of costume, background, etc. The Court held that the photograph was a writing of which the photographer was the author and that the Congress could constitutionally make such photograph the subject of copyright. This left open whether an ordinary photograph of a real life object could constitutionally be a proper subject of copyright.

In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S. Ct. 298, 47 L. Ed. 460 (1903), the Court found it "obvious" that the result could not be affected by the fact that the pictures represented "actual groups visible things" and that such pictures "drawn from the life" (as opposed to a "composed" subject) could be copyrighted. In this connection, the Court declared: "Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy." (188 U.S. at 249, 23 S.Ct. at 299). And later: "The least pretentious picture has more originality in it than directories and the like, which may be copyrighted" (188 U.S. at 250, 23 S.Ct. at 300).

Judge Learned Hand believed that any photograph could be the subject of copyright because in Bleistein the Supreme Court had ruled that "no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike".

There is an interesting case in this Court some fifty years ago. The question was whether a photograph of a street scene showing the Public Library on Fifth Avenue could be the subject of copyright. The decision upheld the copyright, saying among other things (Pagano v. Beseler Co., 234 Fed. 963, 964 (2 Cir. 1916):

 

"It undoubtedly requires originality to determine just when to take the photograph, so as to bring out the proper setting for both animate and inanimate objects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade, position, etc."

Thus, if Zapruder had made his pictures at a point in time before the shooting, he would clearly have been entitled to copyright. On what principle can it be denied because of the tragic event it records?

The defendants argue that "news cannot be copyrighted" citing the Associated Press case and National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union, 119 Fed. 294, 60 L.R.A. 805 (7th Cir. 1902).

Defendants are perfectly correct in their contention. A news event may not be copyrighted, as the cited cases hold. Life claims no copyright in the news element of the event but only in the particular form of record made by Zapruder.

The Associated Press case involved news articles (words) and not photographs. The Associated Press case did not involve copyrighted material but the Court discussed news articles as subjects of copyright. The Court carefully distinguished between the "news element", the "substance of the information" on the one hand, and "the particular form or collocation of words in which the writer has communicated it" (248 U.S. at 234, 39 S.Ct. at 70) on the other. The latter, the "particular form", was recognized as a proper subject of copyright, the Court saying (248 U.S. at 234, 39 S.Ct. at 70):

 

"No doubt news articles often posses a literary quality, and are the subject of literary property at the common law; nor do we question that such an article, as a literary production, is the subject of copyright by the terms of the act as it now stands."

It is said for defendants that the pictures cannot be copyrighted because of "lack of creativity".

This argument has already been dealt with in the discussion just above.

Any photograph reflects "the personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike", to use the words of Judge Learned Hand.

The Zapruder pictures in fact have many elements of creativity. Among other things, Zapruder selected the kind of camera (movies, not snapshots), the kind of film (color), the kind of lens (telephoto), the area in which the pictures were to be taken, the time they were to be taken, and (after testing several sites) the spot on which the camera would be operated.

Re:  Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use

The test of fair use was primarily the degree of injury to the plaintiff (9 Fed. Cas. at 348, 349):

 

"If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto.

 

* * * * * *

 

"But if the defendants may take three hundred and nineteen letters, included in the plaintiffs' copyright, and exclusively belonging to them, there is no reason why another bookseller may not take other five hundred letters, and a third, one thousand letters, and so on, and thereby the plaintiffs' copyright be totally destroyed."

Section 107 of H.R. 2512 and of S. 597 is as follows:

 

"Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use

 

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyright work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall include:

 

(1) the purpose and character of the use;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."

With respect to this provision, the Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House said (H.R.Rep.No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1967)):

 

"Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts. On the other hand, the courts have evolved a set of criteria which though in no sense definitive or determinative, provide some gage for balancing the equities. These criteria have been stated in various ways, but essentially they can all be reduced to the four standards which were stated in the 1964 bill and have been adopted again in the committee's amendment of section 107: `(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work'."

The Committee noted that any precise definition of fair use was impossible and said (at 32) that

 

"* * * the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute. We endorse the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, as outlined earlier in this report, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.

 

"Section 107, as revised by the committee, is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."

The difficult job is to apply the relevant criteria.

There is an initial reluctance to find any fair use by defendants because of the conduct of Thompson in making his copies and because of the deliberate appropriation in the Book, in defiance of the copyright owner. Fair use presupposes "good faith and fair dealing".

In determining the issue of fair use, the balance seems to be in favor of defendants.

There is a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President Kennedy. Thompson did serious work on the subject and has a theory entitled to public consideration. While doubtless the theory could be explained with sketches of the type used at page 87 of the Book and in The Saturday Evening Post, the explanation actually made in the Book with copies is easier to understand. The Book is not bought because it contained the Zapruder pictures; the Book is bought because of the theory of Thompson and its explanation, supported by Zapruder pictures.

There seems little, if any, injury to plaintiff, the copyright owner. There is no competition between plaintiff and defendants. Plaintiff does not sell the Zapruder pictures as such and no market for the copyrighted work appears to be affected. Defendants do not publish a magazine. There are projects for use by plaintiff of the film in the future as a motion picture or in books, but the effect of the use of certain frames in the Book on such projects is speculative. It seems more reasonable to speculate that the Book would, if anything, enhance the value of the copyrighted work; it is difficult to see any decrease in its value.

Case Digest : Philippine Acetylene v. CIR, 17 August 1967

 PHILIPPINE ACETYLENE Co., INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

Facts:

1. Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. (the petitioner) is a corporation engaged in the manu­facture and sale of oxygen and acetylene gases.

2. PAC caters to two customers: (1) National Power Corpora­tion, an agency of the Philippine Government, and to the (2) Voice of America, an agency of the United States Government

3. Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed against, and demanded from, the petitioner the payment of deficiency sales tax and surcharge.

4. Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. denied liability for the payment of the tax on the ground that both the NPC and the VOA are exempt from taxation.

Issue:

Were sales by PAC to exempt entities tax exempt? 

Ruling:

No, PACS is still liable to sales tax. The shifting of the tax burden is merely economics. Its levy on the sales made to tax-exempt entities like the NPC is permissible.

Case Digest: National Leather Co. Inc., v. U. S. Life Insurance Co., G.R. No. L-2668, 30 Sep 1950

 [No. L-2668. September 30, 1950]

NATIONAL LEATHER Co., INC., plaintiff and appellant, vs. THE UNITED STATES LIFE INSURANCE Co., defendant and appellee.

The Parties:

1. National Leather Co., Inc., plaintiff-appellant, a Philippine corporation with offices in the city of Manila
2. Pedro Alejandrino, the person whose life was insured by plaintiff-appellant
3. The United States Life Insurance Co., defendant-appellant, a foreign life insurance company incorporated under the laws of New York, U.S.A., and licensed to do business in the Philippines (except during the period of the Japanese occupation) with main office in New York but with a branch office in Manila

Topic:

Would war be an excuse for non-payment of premium, or would war suspend an insurance contract? NO The nonpayment of premiums does not merely suspend but puts an end to an insurance contract, since the time of the payment is peculiarly of the essence of the contract. The rule is not affected by the fact that the nonpayment is due to war or that the insured has not been negligent.

Facts:

1. On April 14, 1939, plaintiff insured with the defendant the life of Pedro Alejandrino for $5,000 under a 10-year term non-participating policy in consideration of the payment to the defendant, in advance, of the sum of $23.11 as quarterly premium beginning April 14, 19391 and the payment of a like sum every quarter thereafter, also in advance, for a period of 10 years or until the prior death of said Pedro Alejandrino.

2. The stipulated quarterly premiums on the policy were regularly paid up to October 14, 1941, when the last quarterly premium payment was made, covering the period from that date to January 14, 1942.

3. Thereafter no more premiums were paid, it appearing that, because defendant was an American corporation, its branch office in Manila was closed when that city was occupied by the Japanese forces on January 2, 1942, and it had remained closed during the entire period of enemy occupation. It was not reopened until March, 1945.

4. Pedro Alejandrino died on September 23, 1943, that is, beyond the period covered by the premiums paid by the insured.

5. But just the same, after the liberation of Manila in 1945, plaintiff, as the beneficiary named in the policy made a claim for the proceeds thereof and tendered a check for P323.54, the total unpaid premiums from January 14, 1942, to October 14, 1943.

6. Defendant however, rejected the claim and returned the check on the ground that the policy had ceased to be in force as of January 14, 1942, for non-payment of the stipulated premiums.

7. The lower court affirmed the rejection of the insurer.

Issue:

Whether or not a life insurance policy lapses pursuant to its terms because of non-payment of the stipulated premium when such nonpayment occurred at a time when the insurer and the insured were separated by the lines of war.

Ruling:

Yes.

The nonpayment of premiums does not merely suspend but puts an end to an insurance contract, "since the time of the payment is peculiarly of the essence of the contract." The rule is not affected by the fact that the nonpayment is due to war or that the insured has not been negligent. There is, therefore, nothing to the argument that in this case plaintiff's failure to make premium payments after January 14, 1942, should be excused as being due, not to its own negligence, but to defendant's omission to make arrangements for the receipt of premiums that were to fall due during the period of enemy occupation.

We are firmly persuaded that the non-payment of premiums is such a vital defense of insurance companies that since the very beginning, said Act 2427 expressly preserved it, by providing that after the policy shall have been in force for two years, it shall become incontestable (i.e. the insurer shall have no defense) except for fraud, non-payment of premiums, and military or naval service in time of war (Sec. 184[b], Insurance Act). And when Congress recently amended this section (Rep. Act 171), the defense of fraud was eliminated, while the defense of non-payment of premiums was preserved. Thus the fundamental character of the undertaking to pay premiums and the high importance of the defense of non-payment thereof, was specifically recognized.

Case Digest: Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 172406, 11 Oct 2007

 G.R. No. 172406. October 11, 2007.*

CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES EVA MARIE and BENEDICTO NOEL RONQUILLO, respondents.

 

The Parties:

1. DR. CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA, defendant-petitioner

2. ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, co-defendant

3. SPOUSES EVA MARIE and BENEDICTO NOEL RONQUILLO, plaintiff-respondents

Topic: 

"Gross negligence" implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. 

It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. 

It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

Facts of the Case:

1. Spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel Benedicto Ronquillo had not been blessed with a child despite several years of marriage.

2. The spouses thus consulted Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician- gynecologist- consultant at the St. Luke's Medical Center where she was the chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section.

3. Upon Dr. Ilao-Oreta's advice, Eva Marie agreed to undergo a laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the patient's abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her infertility.

4. The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m., to be performed by Dr. Ilao-Oreta.  At around 7:00 a.m. of said date, Eva Marie, accompanied by her husband Noel, checked in at the St. Luke's Medical Center and underwent pre-operative procedures including the administration of intravenous fluid and enema.

5. Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure, however, and no prior notice of its cancellation was received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in Manila.

The Complaint:

The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke's Medical Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City.

The Prayer:

• award of actual damages including alleged loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital

• moral damages

• exemplary damages

• the costs of litigation

• attorney's fees

• and other available reliefs and remedies

Defense of Dr. Ilao-Oreta

• She went on a honeymoon to Hawaii and was scheduled to leave Hawaii at 3:00 p.m. of April 4, 1999 for Manila.

• Aware that her trip from Hawaii to Manila would take about 12 hours, inclusive of a stop-over at the Narita Airport in Japan, she estimated that she would arrive in Manila in the early morning of April 5, 1999. 

• She thus believed in utmost good faith that she would be back in Manila in time for the scheduled conduct of the laparoscopic procedure.

• She failed to consider the time difference between Hawaii and the Philippines, however.

Defense of St. Luke’s Medical Center

• St. Luke's Medical Center contended that the spouses have no cause of action against it since it performed the pre-operative procedures without delay, and any cause of action they have would be against Dr. Ilao-Oreta.

Decision of the RTC

• The failure of Dr. Ilao-Oreta to arrive on time was not intentional.

• Awarded only actual damages in the total amount of Php 9,939 and costs of suit

• No adequate proof that Noel had been deprived of any job contract while attending to his wife in the hospital

The spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Decision of the Court of Appeals

• Dr. Ilao-Oreta is grossly negligent

• Amount of actual damages (for which both defendants are jointly and severally liable), is increased to Php 16,069.40

• Dr. Ilao-Oreta is also held liable to pay: 

• Php 50,000.00 as moral damages (gross negligence)

• Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages (gross negligence)

• Php 20,000.00 as attorney's fees  (the spouses “were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest”)

Dr. Ilao-Oreta filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding Dr. Ilao-Oreta to have acted with gross negligence and awarding moral damages to the Spouses.

2. Whether or not the Spouses are entitled to  recover exemplary damages.

3. Whether or not the Spouses are entitled to  recover attorney’s fees.

4. Whether or not the CA erred in increasing the award of actual damages in favor of the Spouses.

Ruling:

1. On the Award of Moral Damages

Yes, the CA erred; the spouses are not entitled to recover moral damages, Dr. Ilao-Oreta's negligence not being gross.

• Dr. Ilao-Oreta, who had traveled more than twice to the United States where she obtained a fellowship in Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility was indeed negligent when she scheduled to perform professional service at 2:00 p.m. on April 5, 1999 without considering the time difference between the Philippines and Hawaii.

• The doctor's act did not, however, reflect gross negligence.

"Gross negligence" implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care.  It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.  It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.

Firstly, these acts of the doctor reflect an earnest intention to perform the procedure on the day and time scheduled. 

• Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an admitting order with her secretary for one of the spouses to pick up, apprised Eva Marie of the necessary preparations for the procedure, and instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative treatments.

Secondly,

• On realizing that she missed the scheduled procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta, upon arrival in Manila, immediately sought to rectify the same by calling up the spouses to set another schedule.

Thirdly,

• Although Dr. Ilao-Oreta failed to take into consideration the time difference between the Philippines and Hawaii, the situation then did not present any clear and apparent harm or injury that even a careless person may perceive.

Lastly,

• Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for her honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge that excitement attends its preparations.  Her negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross.

2. On the Award of Exemplary Damages

    No, the spouses are not entitled to recover exemplary damages in the absence of a showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

3. On the Award of Attorney’s Fees

    No, the spouses are not entitled to recover attorney’s fees. The records show that they did not exert enough efforts to settle the matter before going to court. The spouses did not demand anything or write to Dr. Ilao-Oreta.

4.  On the Award of Actual Damages

    Yes, the CA erred in increasing the award of actual damages.

    

  The award of actual damages is reduced to Php 2,288.70, representing the net hospital charges (the gross hospital charges of Php 2,416.50 less the unused medicine in the amount of Php  127.80) as substantiated by the hospital’s billing statement.

Basis is Article 2201 of the Civil Code:

    In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those which are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

Dispositive Portion

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that

1)  the award to respondents-spouses Noel and Eva Marie Ronquillo of actual damages is REDUCED to P2,288.70, to bear interest at a rate of 6% per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint on May 18, 1999 and, upon finality of this judgment, at the rate of 12% per annum until satisfaction; and

2. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.